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Abstract  
Using French and British linked employer–employee data this article examines the links between 
non-pecuniary job quality and workplace characteristics in Britain and France – countries with 
very different employment regimes. Job quality is measured through eight dimensions which are 
summarized in a synthetic index. We show that firm size is negatively associated with non-
pecuniary job quality in both countries but in France the association is confined to only the 
largest firms. Internal Labour Markets (ILMs) are associated with higher job quality in France 
along numerous dimensions.  In contrast, ILMs do not improve job quality in Britain except on 
one dimension – they reduce the adverse effects of work on one’s private life. 
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1. Introduction 
Job quality affects worker wellbeing (Karasek, 1979; Author A, 2016), worker productivity 
(Oswald et al., 2015) and thus firm performance (Author A, 2015). It became an EU policy goal 
at the Lisbon summit in 2000 resulting in the development of a dedicated list of indicators 
(Laeken indicators) in 2001. It is multi-faceted but its main features are well-known, including 
dimensions such as wages and income, skills development and training, job security, working 
hours, job autonomy, job intensity, physical working conditions and social environment (Munoz 
de Bustillo et al, 2011). It varies markedly across countries, partly reflecting differences in national 
institutional regimes (Gallie, 2007; Green et al., 2013; Olsen et al, 2010).  However, there is also 
substantial within-country variation in job quality across employees and across workplaces. The 
latter reflects both structural features of workplaces, such as industry affiliation, and the choices 
employers make regarding investments in job quality, which in turn reflect perceptions of the 
costs and benefits of such investments. Osterman (2013), for example, has emphasised the 
importance of accounting for employer decisions over working conditions when seeking to 
understand variance in job quality.  
In the UK, there has been an increasing focus on job quality.  For instance, a recent policy 
paper by the Carnegie Trust (Irvine et al., 2018) encouraged government to place greater 
emphasis on job quality rather than focusing solely on the number of jobs created. They defined 
job quality as multi-faceted, incorporating pay and benefits, health and safety, job design, voice 
and representation, and work-life balance. In France, the issue of job quality was debated in the 
last presidential campaign.  A publication by a public think-tank linked to the Prime Minister 
showed France was close to the EU average in terms of job quality, and that job quality 
(especially the job security dimension) had decreased since the 2008 crisis (France Stratégie, 
2016). More recently, the policy debate has focused on the growth in short temporary contracts, 
and the problems this has caused for workers seeking to maintain unemployment insurance 
contributions (OFCE, 2018). In July 2019 the government responded with a reform requiring 
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employers to make additional insurance contributions for those on contracts of under three 
months duration.  
We contribute to the literature by examining the characteristics of workplaces that are likely 
to influence workers’ perceptions of non-pecuniary job quality in different institutional contexts. 
By using linked employer-employee data we gain insights into the correlates of job quality that are 
not available from household surveys. We focus on two workplace features which, we argue, are 
liable to be important in understanding variance in job quality across workers. These are firm size 
and the existence of internal labour markets (ILMs), characterized by ongoing skill development, 
opportunities for career progression and higher returns to seniority. In doing so we exploit 
similar linked employer-employee data for France and Britain and utilise a multi-dimensional 
approach to non-pecuniary job quality. Data issues limit our ability to compare identical job 
quality items across Britain and France. Thus, the aim of the paper is to examine within-country 
correlations between job quality and workplace characteristics - with a focus on internal labour 
markets and firm size - taking into account the fact that Britain and France represent very 
different types of employment regime. 
Two hypotheses are tested, based on existing literature.  First, job quality should be negatively 
correlated with firm size, but this effect could be mitigated by regulations in the French case, 
such as the existence of compulsory worker representation over a certain firm size. The second 
hypothesis maintains that the existence of an ILM orientation at the workplace level, which 
means more investment in the stability of the workforce (through wage and promotion policies), 
should be favorable to job quality. Previous literature has shown that internal labour markets are 
well-developed in France (Author C, 2016).  
As anticipated, the results show that firm size is negatively associated with non-pecuniary job 
quality in both countries.  It is significantly lower in the largest firms (those with 5,000 or more 
employees) compared with the smallest firms (with fewer than 50 employees). However, whereas 
in France there is no significant difference in job quality between small and medium sized (50-
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4999 employee) firms, in Britain job quality is significantly lower in the medium-sized compared 
with the small firms. It is possible that in France the main legal threshold (at 50 employees) 
(Trésor-Eco, 2016), above which firms are required to respond positively to worker demands for 
union delegates and work councils, helps mitigate the adverse impact of firm size, at least for 
medium-sized firms. The results also show that being in a firm with an ILM is associated with 
better non-pecuniary job quality in France. But this is not the case in Britain. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, focusing on the 
relationship between job quality, firm size and ILMs and outlines our hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the linked employer-employee data for the two countries and the empirical 
methodology. Section 4 presents the results.  Section 5 concludes, reflecting on the implications 
of the analyses while, at the same time, drawing attention to some limitations.  
2. Literature and Hypotheses 
The literature on job quality adopts many different metrics to capture the concept. One strand of 
academic literature focuses on job satisfaction as a measure of job quality (eg. Clark, 2005). 
However, most recent academic research on job quality at the European level uses 
multidimensional definitions of job quality (Gallie 2007, Author B, 2008, Green et al, 2013, 
Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2011), incorporating objective indicators (such as working conditions, 
autonomy, the nature of the employment contract) but also some subjective ones such as 
perceived job security. Gallie (2007) argues ‘objective’ and ‘job satisfaction’ approaches are not 
necessarily at odds with one another since the components of objective job quality appear 
correlated with job satisfaction.  Despite differences in the dimensions considered by these 
frameworks, there is agreement about the basic components of job quality: in addition to wages, 
they usually include working conditions and work autonomy, job security, training and skill 
development opportunities, as well as work-life balance.  
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Factors thought to influence job quality include the sort of employment regime workers face 
(Gallie, 2007; Author B, 2008). For example, the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature 
emphasizes the importance of production regimes (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Coordinated Market 
Economies (CME) like France are characterized by long-term corporate investment and dialogue 
between employers and unions (often labelled “Social Dialogue” in the European Union), 
accompanied by substantial vocational training, all of which are conducive to higher levels of job 
quality. Britain, on the other hand, as a prototypical Liberal Market Economy (LME), is 
characterized by a financial system imposing short-term horizons on firms and high-risk taking, 
which is allied to a deregulated labour market and fragmented, uncoordinated employment 
relations, and an emphasis on general over vocational education, all of which should be 
conducive to lower job quality.  
According to Gallie (2007), job quality also depends on the way employment regimes build 
power resources for labour and capital.  He considers three ideal-types: inclusive, dualist and 
market regimes. France is a dualist employment regime, with a well-protected core of workers, 
surrounded by a precarious periphery. Britain exemplifies a market-based employment regime, 
with very limited regulation and few opportunities for workers to build the sorts of power 
resources which might be used to generate high quality jobs. However, it may also favour some 
greater autonomy for workers. 
Given these differences in production and employment regimes, perceptions of job quality 
are likely to differ in Britain and France, and to be influenced by different workplace 
characteristics.  We expect job quality to vary with firm size in both countries. Some effects may 
lead to a positive relationship between firm size and job quality. Due to their product market 
dominance, and thus the rents that accrue to them, larger firms may offer their workers higher 
job quality than might be offered in similar, smaller firms.  If so, this may be a form of rent-
sharing akin to the well-known wage premium linked to firm size (Oi and Idson, 1999).  Larger 
firms also require formal policies and procedures to manage larger groups of employees 
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efficiently whereas, in smaller firms, less formal systems may suffice.  As such Human Resources 
departments may devote time and energy to human resource management (HRM) systems which 
are often equated with job quality, such as the formation of teams, and the conscious design of 
more attractive jobs offering autonomy and variety.   
However, there are also strong theoretical reasons to suspect that job quality deteriorates as 
firm size increases. Bigger firms are able to use their centralized HR resources to create systems 
of monitoring and supervision which may be inimical to job quality and may choose to divide up 
responsibilities and tasks across workers (for instance through Taylorist methods of production, 
Edwards 1979), which, in smaller firms, may be retained within the same job, thus offering task 
variety.  
Although the theoretical literature regarding firm size and job quality may be ambiguous, the 
empirical literature on employee perceptions of job quality is unequivocal: employees tend to 
express greater satisfaction with their jobs in smaller firms (Author A, 2006; Clark and Oswald, 
1996). Job satisfaction scholars argue that poor management-employee relationships in large 
firms are one source of such job dissatisfaction (Tansel and Gazioglu, 2013). Author A (2006) 
finds that employee job quality in Britain is higher in small firms than in large firms: small firms 
make less use of shifts, zero hours and annual hours contracts and small firm employees are more 
likely to say they have high degrees of control and influence in their work when compared with 
employees in larger firms. The first hypothesis, therefore, is that, in spite of theoretical 
ambiguities regarding firm size and job quality, firm size will be negatively associated with job 
quality.  
However, there might be some differences in the effect of firm size in France and Britain 
given the nature of labour market regulations in the two countries and more generally the 
characteristics of employment regimes. First, in coordinated market economies like France rights 
to worker representation are dependent on firm size thresholds (Fulton, 2015).  Indeed, firms 
with more than 50 employees have to enable workers to appoint union delegates. It is also 
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necessary for them to accede to employee requests for staff delegates where they have more than 
10 employees, as well as a works council where they have more than 50 employees. Such 
regulations are likely to reinforce unions’ ability to mobilize core employees in larger firms 
(Hyman, 2001) and to influence employment conditions. In market employment regimes like 
Britain organized labour has little involvement in decision-making within firms and its influence 
is uniform across the economy (Holman, 2013). Besides, because Britain has low levels of 
employment protection legislation, the standard labour contract is characterized by a high level of 
flexibility: according to OECD data on employment protection legislation, the UK’s employment 
protections for those on regular contracts is among the lowest in the OECD (1.66 in 2013, 
compared to an average of 2.38 in the OECD)i. As a result, employers have greater flexibility to 
hire and fire workers in Britain than in many other European countries, and unions have less 
power to affect employment conditions (Green, 2013). It seems unlikely, therefore, that union 
bargaining power would result in firm size differences in job quality in Britain.  
Second firm size also matters for training policies in France where firm-funded training aims to 
provide better opportunities for career development (Paul, 1992). France differs from Britain in 
placing legal obligations on all firms, but at a higher level for larger firms than for smaller ones 
(1% of the wage bill for firms with more than 10 employees, 0.55% for smaller firms).  The data 
used in the current study do not contain workplaces with fewer than 11 employees, so it is not 
possible to test what effect, if any, this employment threshold has on training-related job quality. 
Nevertheless, firms’ training efforts are directly related with size, even over this 10 employees’ 
threshold, as bigger firms generally spend more than the legal obligation. As a result, training 
participation rates grow with firm size, from 15.6% for firms from 10 to 19 employees up to 
55.9% for firms over 2000 employeesii. This is also related to the fact that training is an issue for 
collective bargaining, at both firm and sector level. British governments also support training 
policies, but very few collective agreements exist on continuing training, and firms have to invest 
voluntarily in their workers with little regulation or subsidy (Greenhalgh, 1999; Ok and Tergeist, 
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2003). Although employees in larger organisations with 250 or more employees have a right to 
time off for training after 26 weeks’ employment it is a right to unpaid time off.iii Given these 
differences in the regulation and functioning of the labour market between the two countries, any 
negative association between firm size and non-pecuniary job quality is liable to be less 
pronounced in France than in Britain.  
Segmentation theory and the comparative literature emphasise the role played by internal 
labour markets (ILMs) in determining job quality.  As defined by Doeringer and Piore (1971), 
ILMs imply better career prospects and more developed training to develop and retain core 
workers, which should be associated with higher job quality. At the country level, segmentation 
theory suggests the co-existence of a primary sector containing better paying, more stable jobs 
and a secondary sector, consisting of employees with poor pay, low job security and otherwise 
unattractive jobs (Piore, 1978). Workplaces with an ILM-type orientation (belonging to the 
primary sector) may offer better job quality to their employees than workplaces that do not have 
an ILM orientation. 
The segmentation literature characterizes France as a country with strong ILMs where core 
workers benefit from employment protection, and have better opportunities for career 
progression within firms, and high returns to seniority (Maurice et al., 1986; Eyraud et al., 1990). 
On the other hand, peripheral workers in the secondary sector tend to be excluded from firms’ 
investments in training (Marsden, 1990). In contrast to France, Britain used to be considered a 
country of occupational labour markets (OLM), in which promotions and careers are based on 
external mobility inside occupations (Eyraudet al., 1990). 
Recent literature has shown that these broad differences between the two countries are still 
valid, although they have weakened. In Britain, firms’ use of OLM has diminished since the 
1990s, and other forms of mobility have been developing, especially in the service sector: entry 
into some activities (media, knowledge intensive services) has become very competitive and 
access to stable and higher status positions largely depends on initial training level and specialty 
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(Marsden, 2007). In France, the prevalence of ILMs has declined, especially for cohorts of young 
entrants (Gautié, 2004), and their functioning has changed: the seniority principle for job 
progression has diminished in importance, while formal continuous vocational training has 
become more important for career progression (Béret, Dupray, 1998). However, the general 
structure of the French labour market remains dual, as indicated by the low transition rates from 
temporary to permanent work (Le Barbanchon, Malherbet, 2013). Recent empirical research also 
indicates that ILMs (defined through wage and training practices) still play an important role in 
French workplaces, whereas they are less frequent in British workplaces (Author C, 2016)iv. 
Therefore, our second hypothesis is that ILMs play a bigger role in determining job quality in 
workplaces in France. As ILMs are generally more frequent in bigger firms, this may mitigate the 
negative firm size effect in the French case. 
 
3 Data and Methods 
The data come from the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS 2011) and from 
the French Enquête Relations Professionnelles et Négociations d’Entreprise (REPONSE 2011). The 
WERS and REPONSE linked employer-employee surveys are among the most authoritative 
sources of  information on employment relations. Other surveys may offer broader coverage of  
the two economies or a larger set of  harmonized data items, but the WERS and REPONSE 
surveys offer the unique advantage that the samples of  workplaces and employees are fully 
linkable in each country. Detailed information about workplace characteristics (size, location, 
ownership, union presence, human resource practices) is available permitting analyses of  their 
influence on workers’ job quality. The data contain both firm size and workplace size, which are 
not used interchangeably. They are identical for single-workplace firms. 
To harmonise the analysis across France and Britain we selected those private sector 
workplaces with eleven or more employees and employees with at least 15 months of tenure. The 
surveys are based on stratified random samples so that when survey weights are applied analyses 
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are representative for this population in both countries. The analysis uses equivalently defined 
samples of 3,947 workplaces and 11,244 employees from REPONSE in 2011 and 1,602 
workplaces and 11,581 employees from WERS 2011.  
The analysis focuses on non-pecuniary job quality. However, a wage residualv has been 
introduced in some specifications to capture the pecuniary aspect of job quality and to test for 
compensating differentials (which imply a negative correlation between wages and non-pecuniary 
job quality). Eight dimensions of non-pecuniary job quality are investigated, reflecting most of 
the dimensions defined in the literature: job insecurity, job autonomy, work intensity, training 
participation, skill development, employee-employer relations, skills matched to job, and adverse 
effects of work on private lifevi. However, caution should be exercised with regard to 
comparisons between France and Britain because the wording of the questions is different in the 
two surveys. Differences in wording (see Appendix Tables A1-A4) partly reflect differences in 
the institutional context where employees are employed (Coutrot, 1998). Thus, this study does 
not compare directly the levels of non-pecuniary job quality in the two countries.  
It is standard in job quality studies to use synthetic indexes to provide an overview of job 
quality and to take into account the possibility of compensation effects when comparing across 
jobs (some dimensions may be poor but compensated by a better situation for another 
dimension). Recent examples of studies using synthetic indexes based on a multiple dimensions 
of job quality include Green et al. (2013) and Munoz de Bustillo et al. (2011). However, an 
additive index can hide important differences in job quality across dimensions so it is valuable to 
decompose the index into its constituent parts and understand what contributes to the observed 
differences between jobs/workers on sub-indices.  
Responses to questions relating to job quality were coded as 0/1 variables where a code “1” 
indicates the job has a particular attribute while a “0” indicates it is absent. In a number of cases 
this entailed recoding ordinal responses into dummy variables. The resulting job quality indicators 
are presented in Table 1.  Full details of the survey questions and weighted distributions are 
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presented in Appendix Tables A1-A4, with bivariate correlations between job quality items 
presented in Appendix Tables A5-A6).  
Although the exact question wording is not identical for each item across countries, they are 
broadly highly comparable – which is not surprising since REPONSE’s structure and 
questionnaires were strongly influenced by the WERS surveys (Amossé et al, 2015).  As 
Appendix Tables A1-A4 indicate, the wording for some items is very similar across country, in 
others this is less so, but in all cases the comparison passes a face validity check in the sense that 
the items are clearly capturing the same underlying concept.  We therefore undertake statistical 
analyses to establish whether, in each country, the sub-indices are correlated in a way that 
indicates they capture a single latent variable which we can call non-pecuniary job quality.  We 
find that they do so.  In both countries, factor analyses actually identified a single factor with an 
eigen value above 1 (2.23 in France and 1.92 in Britain). In France, this factor accounts for 96% 
of the variance in the eight items and in Britain it accounts for 89% of the variance. It is this 
index we use for each country. The index, which runs from zero to eight, therefore receives 
statistical support in our data, suggesting we pass a test of construct validity, despite small 
differences in individual items across countries. 
Table 1 shows the percentage of employees in each survey scoring ‘1’ on each of the job 
quality items. Relatively few employees in either country perceived their jobs as insecure, even 
though the surveys took place not long after the Great Recession. In both surveys perceptions of 
understanding between management and employees are similar, with roughly half giving 
management positive scores.  Question wording in other dimensions makes direct comparisons 
across countries difficult. For instance, concerning job demand, nearly three-quarters of private 
sector employees in France (72%) said they were working under time pressure. when two-fifths 
(41%) of British employees reported that they never had enough time to get the work done. As 
far as autonomy is concerned, British employees were very likely to say they have some or a lot of 
influence over how to do their work (85%). In France, perceived autonomy seems more limited, 
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but the question asked is different, since workers are asked if they are free to decide how to work, 
and 67% answer positively.  
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
Appendix Table A7 presents the distribution of employees across the firm size distribution in 
each country.vii  Twenty-four per cent of French employees are working in workplaces belonging 
to firms with between 11 and 49 employees. In Britain, only 15% are employed in small firms and 
employees are more concentrated in the largest firms: 31% are in workplaces which belong to 
firms with more than 5,000 employees, compared to 16% in France.  
The ILM indicator used in the current study is the one used by Author C (2016) using the 
same data as the present article. Workplaces with a strong ILM orientation are those which, for a 
given gender, age, and education profile within the workforce, sit at or above the median in both 
the distribution of workplace fixed effects for employee job tenure and the distribution of 
workplace fixed effects on wages. Appendix Table A8 shows that 13% of employees in Britain 
are in workplaces with an ‘ILM’ orientation whereas in France this is the case for 33% of 
employees, consistent with the proposition discussed earlier that ILMs are more prevalent in 
France.  
Multivariate models were estimated on the additive job quality indicator having transformed it 
into a standardized z-score with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1, which makes it 
easier to interpret the quantitative association between job quality and various individual and 
workplace characteristics.The big advantage of the data that is that workplace and firm traits are 
not collected from the respondent providing the job quality metrics, but from HR managers. This 
means we avoid inter-rater biases that plague single respondent surveys such as European 
Working Conditions Survey, whilst limiting measurement error in dimensions of the workplace – 
such as size – where HR managers’ responses are less prone to error than individual employees’ 
responses. 
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Ordinary Least Squares models were estimated to capture the variance in job quality across 
employees in workplaces with different characteristics, based on the following equation 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =𝛼  +𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾 𝑍𝑗 + λ𝐼𝐿𝑀𝑗 + µ𝐹𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗              (1) 
 
where Yij  is the dependent variable job quality of  employee I in workplace j. 
𝑋𝑖𝑗corresponds to a vector of  demographic and job characteristics namely gender, age (three 
categories), education (seven categories), union membership, tenure (four categories), type of  
contract (three categories) and working hours (five categories).  
𝑍𝑗 is a vector of  workplace and firm characteristics, namely single-digit industry (twelve 
categories), family ownership (three categories), foreign ownership (two categories), and location 
(two categories).  
ILM is a dummy variable indicating the existence of  ILM in the firm j, and F represents firm 
size (four categories). 
 Estimates are run separately for each country. The empirical analysis includes two steps. In a 
first step estimations are run to test the relationships between individual and firm characteristics 
(focusing on firm size and ILM) and job quality, and therefore testing hypotheses1and 2. In a 
second step the same equation is run with eight different dependent variables (Qij which are (0,1) 
dummy dependent variables) corresponding to job quality sub-dimensions. 
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4.  Results 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present models for Britain and France respectively testing hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Before turning to the main results on firm size and ILMs, other results will be briefly discussed 
that are consistent with our portrayals of France and Britain as different types of employment 
regime. For example, in France, non-pecuniary job quality is positively correlated with higher 
levels of education. The finding is consistent with the idea that France has a dualist employment 
regime in which the more highly educated are able to enter better jobs. In Britain, on the other 
hand, more highly educated employees report lower job quality, perhaps due to skills mismatch 
where the expectations of better educated workers do not match the available jobs in the labour 
market.  
In France workplace tenure of less than five years is associated with lower non-pecuniary job 
quality than being in a workplace ten years or more. This is in line with the expectation that in 
dualist regimes employees with higher tenure have higher job quality than employees with lower 
levels of tenure. This does not appear to be the case in Britain, in accordance with expectations 
regarding a market-oriented employment regime where the “insider” status conferred by high 
tenure is less relevant. 
[INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3] 
Atypical working hours are associated with lower job quality: in France it is part-time workers 
(30 to 35 hours a week) who suffer lower job quality, while in Britain it is those working long 
hours (over 41 hours)viii. No association is found with temporary or fixed contracts in France, but 
this may be explained by the fact that short term contracts are not taken into account here as the 
REPONSE survey does not include workers who have been employed for less than 15 months. 
In Britain, those on temporary contracts experience lower job quality. 
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Turning to the association between non-pecuniary job quality and workplace features, the 
focus is on firm size and the presence of ILMs. Concerning firm size, the findings show that 
working in a large firm (5,000 employees and over) decreases job quality, consistent with 
hypothesis one. However, the negative association between firm size and job quality is confined 
to these very large firms in France. In Britain, on the other hand, the negative association is 
significant and apparent for firms as small as 500 employees.  The absence of a firm size effect 
for medium-sized firms in France may be associated with the worker representation rights 
accorded workers in firms with at least 50 employees. 
The coefficient for ILMs is positive in both countries, but it is only statistically significantly 
associated with non-pecuniary job quality in France. This confirms our second hypothesis that 
ILMs play an important role in the French labour market and favour job quality.  Furthermore, in 
the French case the interaction between ILM and the largest firm size (10,000 plus employees) is 
positive and statistically significant, whereas it is negative and non-significant for Britain (Table 
A9), thus confirming our contention in hypothesis two that ILMs mitigate the negative 
association between firm size and job quality, but only in the French case. These results show the 
relevance of considering ILM practices as important drivers of job quality in the French 
employment regime, and the need to integrate this feature in workplace-oriented analyses of job 
quality. 
Turning to other features of the employer, industry effects are significant in both countries: 
compared to manufacturing, energy, construction, health, and business services have significantly 
higher job quality. Employment in a family-owned business is associated with lower non-
pecuniary job quality in France but not in Britain. Forth and Rebérioux (2016) also show the 
existence of a wage penalty in family-owned firms. Furthermore, the results show that 
employment in foreign-owned business is associated with lower non-pecuniary job quality in 
France, but not in Britain. 
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In both countries, we have tested models introducing a wage residual to capture the monetary 
dimension of job quality (table 4 below) and to see how it relates to our non-pecuniary job quality 
index. As noted earlier the wage residual is obtained from separate log hourly wage regressions 
for REPONSE and WERS based on OLS models containing gender, age, qualifications and 
occupation.ix The results show a positive link between non-pecuniary job quality and wages, 
which runs counter to expectations regarding compensating wage differential, but rather 
underlines a strong link between pecuniary and non-pecuniary job quality, as might be the case if 
workers with strong bargaining power in the labour market, or in workplaces with surplus rents, 
were able to extract both good wages and good non-wage job quality from their employer. The 
introduction of the wage residual in the regressions does not change the ILM and firm size 
effects commented above, therefore confirming the results when the monetary dimension of job 
quality is taken into account. 
[INSERT TABLES 4] 
 
Several robustness checks have been performed to test for the sensitivity of the results to 
alternative codingx or definitions of the variables, as mentioned above (firm size, job quality 
index): both ILM and firm size effects appear stable. 
In a second step, we want to disaggregate the effects of firms’ characteristics (and especially 
firm size and the existence of ILM) on the various components of job quality. The estimates for 
each of the eight dimensions of job quality are presented in Tables 5 and 6 for France and Britain 
respectively.  The controls are identical to those used in Tables 2 and 3.  
 
[INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6] 
 
Concerning hypothesis 1, the negative correlation between firm size and job quality is 
confirmed for five sub-dimensions in France, the exceptions being job demand, employer-
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employee relations and training participation. Effects for job demand and employer-employee 
relations are not significant, whereas the link between firm size and training is positive. Negative 
effects on skill development and work-life balance are concentrated in biggest firms (more than 
5000), whereas they also appear for firms of more than 500 employees in the case of job 
insecurity, skill’s match and autonomy.  
In Britain, bigger firms are associated with lower job quality in terms of increased job 
demands, adverse effects on work-life balance, poor employment relations, and lower job 
autonomy. Firm size matters little for job insecurity, skill development and the job match, and is 
positive for training, as in the French case.  
Concerning hypothesis 2 and the contribution of ILM to perceived job quality, results are 
quite different in the two countries. In France, working in an ILM workplace is positively 
associated with 6 of the 8 dimensions of non-pecuniary job quality (skill development, skills 
match, training participation, job autonomy, work-life balance, and employment relations).  In 
Britain, on the other hand, the only positive association between ILMs and job quality related to 
work-life balance. This confirms the importance of internal labour markets for workers in 
France, but not in Britain.  
 
5. Conclusion  
Using linked employer-employee data we investigated the workplace and firm correlates of 
non-pecuniary job quality in Britain and France.  We focused in particular on the role played by 
firm size and internal labour markets. Two hypotheses were tested which emanate from the 
literature on institutional systems in France and Britain. There was broad support for the first 
hypothesis, which was that firm size would be negatively associated with job quality in both 
countries.  This was the case when estimating a model for job quality using the additive scale, 
although analyses of subcomponents of job quality revealed quite a complex picture, with firm 
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size negatively associated with job quality in nine of the sixteen models, positively associated with 
job quality in two of the models, and non-significant in the remaining five models.   
There was also broad support for the second hypothesis that ILMs improve job quality in 
France but not in Britain. The result was apparent for the job quality additive scale and was 
broadly supported when we turned to job quality subcomponents. This result may suggest that 
specific  employment conditions, more favorable to job quality, still exist in France in a segment 
of the labour market (ILM workplaces). For the two countries, the results show that firms’ 
characteristics and practices matter for job quality, suggesting that job quality policy should take 
into account firm-level heterogeneity. 
Our findings deepen our knowledge of firms’ behavior and policy choices in each country. 
France, as an example of coordinated market economy, tends to create a distinction between core 
and peripheral employees. It guarantees good non-pecuniary job quality for the core employees 
who are working in companies with an internal labour market, inducing a risk of strengthening 
the inequalities between core and peripheral workers. Being in a workplace with an ILM structure 
in France helps the core employees to have higher skill development perspectives, more 
possibilities for training participation, better skill’s match to a job, higher job autonomy, better 
relations with the employer and better work-life balance. In Britain, a quintessential liberal market 
economy, the distinction between core and peripheral workers seems less relevant, and ILMs 
have less effect on job quality components. In both countries, training participation is higher in 
bigger firms, which underlines the necessity for training policies to target smaller firms in order in 
increase that particular job quality component. 
There are a number of limitations to this study.  It is impossible to tackle the issue of non-
random exposure of different sorts of workers to different types of job quality environments.  
Results may differ somewhat once non-random selection is accounted for.  Also, it is unclear as 
to whether poorer perceptions of job quality in large firms reflect objective job quality criteria or 
whether they simply reflect different reference points of employees in small and large firms.  It 
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may be, for instance, that those workers who sort into small firms have fundamentally different 
expectations to those sorting into larger firms, or else they are different sorts of people whose 
preferences differ in ways that are difficult to observe.  Ideally, it is necessary to observe workers 
switching firms to establish what role unobserved worker heterogeneity plays, but that is not 
possible with these cross-sectional data. 
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Endnotes
                                                 
i Data extracted on 25 Jul 2019 09:48 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat : 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EPL_CD. 
 
iiSource : Céreq, Déclarations fiscales des employeurs n° 2483, http://www.cereq.fr/sous-
themes/Enquetes-FC/Le-financement-de-la-formation-par-les-entreprises-24-83. 
iii https://www.gov.uk/training-study-work-your-rights 
iv According to that analysis, 24.8% of  workplaces are ILMs in France in 2011, against 7.6% 
in Britain (Author C, 2016). 
vThe wage residual is obtained from separate log hourly wage regressions for REPONSE and 
WERS based on OLS models containing gender, age, qualifications and occupation. This is 
intended to capture the wage premium (penalty) a worker receives conditional on his/her human 
capital attributes.  
 
vi See Munoz de Bustillo et al (2011) for a survey of  the literature on job quality indicators. 
viiThe data contain both firm size and workplace size, which are not used interchangeably. 
They are identical for single-workplace firms. 
viii That result holds when more detailed working time categories are introduced in order to 
take into account short part-time (which is quite developed in Britain but remains very limited in 
France). 
ix Full details of  the derivation of  the wage residual are available on request. 
x We disaggregated the firm size variable to five categories (less than 50; 50-99; 100-999; 
1000-4999; 5000 and more).  In Britain, job quality is lower in firms with more than 1000 
employees, and in France, job quality is lower in large firms with more than 5000 employees.  We 
have also tested the models by adding another category for firm size - more than 10 000 
employees. In both countries job quality is lower in firms with more than 10 000 employees. 
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Table 1: Employee Job Quality in the WERS (2011) and REPONSE (2011) surveys.  
 WERS (Britain) REPONSE (France) 
Job insecurity Feel job is insecure 16 (0.37) Likely to lose job 16 (0.37) 
Job demands Never enough time 41 (0.49) Time pressure 72 (0.45) 
Job autonomy Influence over how to work 85 (0.35) Free to decide how to work 67 (0.47) 
Training 
participation 
How much organized by 
employer 52 (0.50) 
How much funded by 
employer 46 (0.50) 
Skill development Encouraged to develop skills 56 (0.50) Enabled to learn new things  43 (0.50) 
Employee –
employer relations 
Sincere in understanding 
employees’ views 55 (0.50) 
Manager pays attention to 
what I say 51 (0.50) 
Skills matched to 
job 
Skills I have match skills 
needed 44 (0.50) Fully able to use your skills 63 (0.48) 
Adverse effects of 
work on one’s  
private life 
Difficult fulfilling 
commitments outside work  
29 (0.45) 
Job allows to organize 
private life  36 (0.48) 
N  11,581  11,244 
Notes: Table is weighted using employee survey weights. Job quality is based on 8-point item scale. The scales for job quality 
range from 0 (low) to +8 (high). Standard deviation in parentheses. 
Base: All employees with at least one year’s tenure, in private workplaces with 11 or more employees, and no missing data on job 
quality. 
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Table 2: Job Quality (in standardized z-score), in Britain. 
Constant 0.43*** (0.09) 
Gender: male (Ref. female) -0.04 (0.04) 
Age 16-29 (Ref: 31-49) 0.06 (0.04) 
50+ 0.01 (0.05) 
Education: Level 2 (Ref: Level 0/1) -0.20*** (0.06) 
Level 3 -0.19*** (0.05) 
Level5B -0.14** (0.07) 
Level 5A short -0.23*** (0.05) 
Level 5A long -0.10 0.06 
Tenure: Less than 5 years (Ref: more than 10 years) 0.01 (0.05) 
5 to 10 years  -0.01 (0.05) 
Hours: 0-29 hours per week (Ref: 36-40 hours per week) 0.03 (0.04) 
30-35 -0.02 (0.05) 
41-49 -0.15*** (0.04) 
50+ -0.23*** (0.06) 
Contract: Temporary (Ref: permanent) -0.24* (0.14) 
Fixed  0.03 (0.08) 
Union member: yes -0.21*** (0.05) 
Firm size: 50-499 (Ref.: less than 50) -0.04 (0.05) 
500-4999 -0.15** (0.06) 
5000 and more  -0.15*** (0.06) 
ILM workplace: yes (Ref. no) 0.07 (0.06) 
Industry: Energy (Ref: manufacturing) 0.39*** (0.11) 
Construction 0.22*** (0.09) 
Wholesale and retail 0.03 (0.08) 
Hotels and restaurants 0.04 (0.09) 
Transport and communication -0.06 (0.10) 
Financial services 0.18 (0.11) 
Other business 0.16** (0.07) 
Education  0.15* (0.09) 
Health  0.32*** (0.08) 
Other community services  0.07 (0.09) 
Family ownership:  25% of equity capital -0.05 (0.05) 
Foreign ownership: yes (Ref. no) 0.02 (0.06) 
Capital city: yes (Ref.: no) 0.07 (0.06) 
R-squared  0.05 
Observations  8,540 
Number of workplaces  962 
Notes: Weighted OLS regressions. Dummies for missing observations are not presented. Clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. The index of job quality is presented in the section 3. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; p<0.1.  
Base: All employees in the WERS (2011) survey with at least one year’s tenure, in private workplaces with 11 or more 
employees, with no missing data on job quality  
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Table 3: Job Quality (in standardized z-score), in France  
Constant -0.39*** (0.08) 
Gender: male (Ref. female) 0.05 (0.03) 
Age 16-29 (Ref: 31-49) 0.04 (0.04) 
50+ 0.03 (0.12) 
Education: Level 2 (Ref: Level 0/1) 0.12 (0.09) 
Level 3 0.18*** (0.05) 
Level5B 0.39*** (0.06) 
Level 5A short 0.31*** (0.07) 
Level 5A long 0.50*** (0.07) 
Tenure: Less than 5 years (Ref: more than 10 years) -0.09* (0.05) 
5 to 10 years  0.004 (0.04) 
Hours: 0-29 hours per week (Ref: 36-40 hours per week) -0.08 (0.06) 
30-35 -0.09** (0.04) 
41-49 -0.01 (0.04) 
50+ -0.08 (0.05) 
Contract: Temporary (Ref: permanent) 0.16 (0.23) 
Fixed  -0.001 (0.08) 
Union member: yes -0.25*** (0.05) 
Firm size: 50-499 (Ref.: less than 50) -0.06 (0.04) 
500-4999 -0.01 (0.05) 
5000 and more  -0.09* (0.06) 
ILM workplace: yes (Ref. no) 0.22*** (0.04) 
Industry: Energy (Ref: manufacturing) 0.47*** (0.17) 
Construction 0.25*** (0.07) 
Wholesale and retail 0.07 (0.05) 
Hotels and restaurants -0.01 (0.14) 
Transport and communication 0.02 (0.06) 
Financial services 0.12 (0.09) 
Other business 0.12** (0.05) 
Education  -0.08 (0.24) 
Health  0.28*** (0.06) 
Other community services  0.21** (0.09) 
Family ownership:  25% of equity capital -0.16*** (0.04) 
Foreign ownership: yes (Ref. no) -0.13** (0.06) 
Capital city: yes (Ref.: no) -0.02 (0.04) 
R-squared  0.07 
Observations  7,023 
Number of workplaces  2,935 
Notes: Weighted OLS regressions. Dummies for missing observations are not presented. Clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. The index of job quality is presented in the section 3. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; p<0.1.  
Base: All employees in the REPONSE (2011) survey with at least one year’s tenure, in private workplaces with 11 or 
more employees, with no missing data on job quality 
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Table 4. Job Quality (in standardized z-score) and Firm size in France and Britain with the wage 
residual 
 France (REPONSE) Britain (WERS) 
Constant -0.39*** (0.08) 0.45*** (0.09) 
Firm size: 50-499 (Ref.: less than 50) -0.07* (0.04) -0.05 (0.05) 
500-4999 -0.02 (0.05) -0.16*** (0.06) 
5000 and more  -0.10* (0.06) -0.17*** (0.06) 
ILM workplace: yes (Ref. no) 0.17*** (0.04) 0.06 (0.06) 
Wage residual  0.41*** (0.06) 0.11*** (0.03) 
R-squared  0.08 0.06 
Observations  7,020 7,883 
Number of workplaces  2,935 954 
Notes: Weighted OLS regressions. Dummies for missing observations are not presented. All models control for 
individual and workplace job characteristics. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The index of job quality is 
presented in the section 3. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; p<0.1.  
Base: All employees in the REPONSE (2011) and WERS (2011)surveys with at least one year’s tenure, in private 
workplaces with 11 or more employees, with no missing data on job quality  
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Table 5: Subcomponents of job quality in France 
 Job 
demand 
Insecurity Skill 
development 
Skills’ match 
to a job 
Training 
participation 
Job 
autonomy 
Adverse 
effects of 
work on 
one’s 
private life  
Employee-
employer 
relation 
Firm size: 50-499 
(Ref.: less than 50) 
0.023 
(0.014) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.05*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
500-4,999 0.019 
(0.016) 
-0.05*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.05*** 
(0.02) 
-0.003 
(0.02) 
0.004 
(0.02) 
5,000 and more  0.016 
(0.019) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.14*** 
(0.03) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.13*** 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
ILM (Ref.: no) yes -0.14 
(0.013) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.02) 
Constant 0.70*** 
(0.03) 
0.19*** 
(0.03) 
0.26*** 
(0.03) 
0.69*** 
(0.03) 
0.25*** 
(0.03) 
0.61*** 
(0.03) 
0.30*** 
(0.03) 
0.44*** 
(0.03) 
R2 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.03 
Number of employees 9,465 7,341 9,459 9,443 9,346 9,463 9,464 9,433 
Number of workplaces 3,205 2,977 3,202 3,202 3,189 3,201 3,203 3,198 
Notes: Weighted OLS regressions. Dummies for missing observations are not presented. All models control for individual and workplace job characteristics. Clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; p<0.1. 
Base: All employees in the REPONSE (2011) survey with at least one year’s tenure in private workplaces with 11 or more employees, with no missing data on job quality. 
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Table 6: Subcomponents of job quality in Britain 
 Job 
demand 
Insecurity Skill 
development 
Skills’ match 
to a job 
Training 
participation 
Job 
autonomy 
Adverse 
effects of 
work on 
one’s 
private life 
Employee-
employer 
relation 
Firm size:50-499 
(Ref.: less than 50) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.03) 
500-4,999 0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
5,000 and more  0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.08*** 
(0.03) 
ILM (Ref.: no) yes 0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Constant 0.31*** 
(0.04) 
0.10*** 
(0.04) 
0.64*** 
(0.05) 
0.68*** 
(0.04) 
0.26*** 
(0.05) 
0.94*** 
(0.03) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.64*** 
(0.04) 
R2 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.05 
Number of employees 9,047 8,908 9,079 9,154 9,137 9,115 9,161 9,081 
Number of workplaces 964 965 965 965 965 965 965 965 
Notes: Weighted OLS regressions. Dummies for missing observations are not presented. All models control for individual and workplace job characteristics. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Statistical significance denoted by *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; p<0.1. 
Base: All employees in the WERS (2011) survey with at least one year’s tenure in private workplaces with 11 or more employees, with no missing data on job quality. 
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Appendices 
 
A1. Job Quality variables in the WERS survey 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
 Coded 1 Coded 0 
Job demand 
I never seem to have enough time to get my 
work done (N=11,333) 
14 27 31 25 3 
Job insecurity  
I feel my job is secure in this workplace 
(N=11,147 ) 
17 46 21 12 5 
Employee-employer relations 
Managers are sincere in attempting to 
understand employees’ views (N=11,370) 
11 43 24 15 6 
Skill development 
Managers encourage to develop their skills 
(N=11,351) 
13 42 26 13 6 
Adverse effects of work on one’s private 
life  
I often find it difficult to fulfill my 
commitments outside of work because of the 
amount of time I spend on my job 
(N=11,506) 
9 20 25 37 9 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
 Coded 0 Coded 1 
Job insecurity  
I feel my job is secure in this workplace 
(N=11,147 ) 
17 46 21 12 4 
Notes: Weighted frequencies in cells in percentages. 14% of employees reported that they 
strongly agreed that they never seemed to have enough time to get their work done. 
Base: All employees with at least one year of tenure, in private sector workplaces with 11 or 
more employees, with no missing data on job quality. 
Source: WERS (2011) survey. 
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A2. Other job quality variables in the WERS survey  
 Weighted Frequencies Coded  
 
Training participation: Apart from health and safety training, how much training have you had 
during the last 12 months, either paid or organized by your employer? 
None  34 0 
Less than 1 day  13 0  
1 to less than 2 days  16 1 
2 to less than 5 days 20 1 
5 to less than 10 days  10 1 
10 days and more  6 1 
N=11,468  
Skills’ match to a job: How well do the work skills you personally have match the skills you need to 
do your present job?  
Much higher  20 0 
A bit higher  32 0 
About the same 44 1 
A bit lower 4 0 
Much lower 1 0 
N=11,489  
Job autonomy: In general, how much influence do you have over how to do your work? 
A lot  54 1 
Some  31 1 
A little  10 0 
None  5 0 
N=11,446  
Notes: frequencies in cells in percentages. 34 % of employees reported that they had no training in 
the last 12 months, 20 % of employees reported that their skills are much higher than the present job 
they had, and 54 % of employees reported that they had a lot of influence over their work. 
Source: WERS (2011) survey. 
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A3. Job Quality variables in the REPONSE survey 
 Always Often Sometimes Never 
 Coded 1 Coded 0 
Job demand: In your work, is there 
any time pressure? (N=11,160) 
31 41 25 2 
Adverse effects of work on one’s 
private life  
Does your work allow you to organize 
your private life satisfactorily? 
(N=11,179) 
18 45 30 6 
Job autonomy: Are you free to decide 
how to do your work? (N=11,161) 
20 47 23 10 
Skills’ match to a job: In your work, 
are you fully able to use your skills? 
N=11,132 
19 45 30 7 
Skill development: Does your work 
enable you to learn new things? 
N=11,147 
11 32 45 12 
Employee-employer relations: Does 
your line manager pay attention to 
what you say? (N=11,115) 
15 36 39 10 
Notes: Weighted frequencies in cells in percentages. 18 % of employees reported 
that work always allowed them to organize private life satisfactorily. 
Base: All employees with at least one year of tenure, in private sector workplaces 
with 11 or more employees, with no missing data on job quality. 
Source: REPONSE (2011) survey. 
 
 
 
A4. Other job quality variables in the REPONSE survey  
 Weighted Frequencies Coded  
 
Training participation: During the last three years, have you undertaken any vocational training 
financed by your employer? (REPONSE survey) 
Yes 46 1 
No  54 0  
N=11,002  
Job insecurity: During the next 12 months, what is the likelihood of losing the job? 
Very high 5 1 
High 11 1 
Low  47 0 
Nil 37 0 
N=8,593  
Notes: frequencies in cells in percentages. 46% of employees reported that they had vocational 
training in the past three years, 5% of employees reported that the likelihood was very high to lose the 
job. 
Base: All employees with at least one year of tenure, in private sector workplaces with 11 or more 
employees, with no missing data on job quality. 
Source: REPONSE (2011) survey. 
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A5: Correlation matrix of job quality measures in the REPONSE survey 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Free to decide how to work 1.00        
2. Believes job is not secure -0.16 1.00       
3. Work adversely affects private life -0.20 0.13 1.00      
4. Able to learn or develop skills 0.26 -0.12 -0.11 1.00     
5. Skills matched to job 0.34 -0.19 -0.15 0.39 1.00    
6. Training received 0.11 -0.09 -0.03 0.19 0.13 1.00   
7. Manager pays attention/understands 
employees 
0.31 -0.20 -0.21 0.29 0.34 0.13 1.00  
8. Working under time pressures -0.06 0.05 0.15 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 1.00 
Base: Employees of all firms with 11 or more employees with at least one year’s tenure in private sector 
workplace. N= 8,201 
 
 
A6: Correlation matrix of job quality measures in the WERS survey 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Free to decide how to work 1.00        
2. Believes job is not secure -0.13 1.00       
3. Work adversely affects private life -0.05 0.09 1.00      
4. Able to learn or develop skills 0.19 -0.19 -0.11 1.00     
5. Skills matched to job 0.05 -0.08 -0.06 0.13 1.00    
6. Training received 0.09 -0.08 0.02 0.26 0.03 1.00   
7. Manager pays attention/understands 
employees 
0.19 -0.22 -0.13 0.51 0.09 0.14 1.00  
8. Working under time pressures -0.01 0.07 0.27 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.08 1.00 
Base: Employees of all firms with 11 or more employees with at least one year’s tenure in private 
sector workplace. N= 10,592 
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A7: The distribution of employees across firm size in the WERS and REPONSE 
surveys. 
 Britain (WERS) France (REPONSE) 
11-49 15% 24% 
50-499 23% 34% 
500-4,999 29%  25% 
5,000 and more 31% 16% 
Missing 2% 1% 
N 11,581 11,244 
Notes: Weighted frequencies in cells in percentages.  
Base: All employees with at least one year of tenure, in private sector workplaces with 11 
or more employees, 
 
A8: The share of employees in workplaces with an ILM orientation in the WERS 
and REPONSE surveys 
 Britain (WERS) France (REPONSE) 
Yes 13% 33% 
No 80% 65% 
Missing 7% 2% 
N 11,581 11,244 
Notes: In the WERS survey 13% of employees are in workplaces which have an ‘ILM’ 
orientation in the WERS survey. The ILM orientation of the workplace is defined by Forth 
et al. (2016) as the share of workplaces with high levels of job tenure and the payment of 
above market wages.  
Base: All employees with at least one year of tenure, in private sector workplaces with 11 
or more employees 
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A9. The interaction between ILM and firm size 
   
 Britain (WERS) France (REPONSE) 
Constant  0.39*** 
(0.08) 
-0.44*** 
(0.08) 
Firm size: 100-999 (ref.: <100) 0.034 
(0.05) 
0.042 
(0.05) 
1000-4999 -0.134* 
(0.077) 
0.047 
(0.06) 
5000 - 9999 -0.083 
(0.108) 
0.037 
(0.14) 
10,000 and more  -0.113* 
(0.058) 
-0.157** 
(0.06) 
ILM workplace : Yes (ref.: no) 0.128 
(0.119) 
0.182*** 
(0.062) 
Firm size (<100) * ILM (ref. no)   
100-999*ILM (yes) -0.007 
(0.16) 
-0.003 
(0.08) 
1000-4999*ILM (yes) -0.18 
(0.18) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
5000 – 9999* ILM (yes) 0.02 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.23) 
10,000 and more * ILM (yes) -0.20 
(0.15) 
0.23** 
(0.12) 
R-squared 0,06 0,07 
Observations 8,540 7,023 
Number of workplaces 962 2,935 
Notes: Weighted OLS regressions. Dummies for missing observations are not presented. All models control for 
individual and workplace job characteristics. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The index of job quality is 
presented in the section 3. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; p<0.1 
Base: All employees in the REPONSE (2011) and WERS (2011)surveys with at least one year’s tenure, in 
private workplaces with 11 or more employees, with no missing data on job quality 
 
